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INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis in Russia that began in November 1997 and ended
with the dramatic ruble devaluation in August – September 1998 was not
as unexpected as the series of crises in East Asia. It was obvious to
many economists that the policy of building up state debt coupled with
slow progress in fiscal reform was bound to be unsustainable. Mostly
unexpected was the scale of the devaluation of the national currency,
which was not forecasted by even the most pessimistic analysts. In
summer 1999, the Russian government found itself to be unable to
service its debt, acquired in the form of state bonds (GKOs and OFZs)
under high domestic interest rates, and simultaneously keep the ex-
change rate within the official band. Uncontrolled ruble devaluation and
unilateral restructuring of the domestic GKO-OFZ debt undermined the
stability of the Russian banking system.
The Russian crisis is considered as mainly a government debt crisis;
however, alternative views also exist. In particular Montes and Popov
(1999) argue that the primary cause of the crisis was overvaluation of the
domestic currency. Nevertheless, all researchers agree that the timing of
the crisis was largely determined by the actions of foreign investors in
the domestic financial market. It is well known that Russia abolished
capital controls under the pressure of the International Monetary Fund,
which was widely criticized as making the domestic economy dependent
on world financial markets. Already by the beginning of the crisis, the
share of non-residents in the GKO-OFZ market amounted to about 40%,
meaning that foreign investors might significantly influence the market
balance. Understanding the role of non-residents in the development of
the Russian crisis is important in order to assess the consequences of a
liberal balance of payments policy in Russia and formulate policy rec-
ommendations for the future. The aim of this research is to study the
behavior of non-residents during the financial crisis in November 1997 –
August 19981 and try to explain the stylized facts. This task is rather
complicated given that during the period under consideration the finan-
cial market was highly unstable and it is difficult to apply standard
econometric analysis. The study was made possible by the availability of
high frequency data on individual investors' behavior, which permitted
application of non-parametric analysis.
                                               
1 The end of October 1997, when the downward trend of domestic interest rates
was sharply reversed, should be considered as the beginning of the crisis.
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The empirical investigation suggests that non-residents indeed destabi-
lized the GKO-OFZ market during the period of financial turbulence. We
formulated two hypotheses that can explain this fact. The first hypothesis
states that non-residents, who were global investors, had more diversi-
fied alternative investment opportunities and hence were relatively more
sensitive to changes in market fundamentals. In order to justify the hy-
pothesis, we constructed a model of the financial market and investi-
gated the effect of changes in fundamentals on the allocation of securi-
ties between different types of market participants. We showed that if
investment in an economy is associated with a high degree of uncer-
tainty, then participation of non-residents in the state bond market leads
to an overreaction to the change in fundamentals. The idea underlying
this result is that domestic investors consider investment in state bonds
as a means of reducing portfolio risk whereas foreign investors allocate
some small fraction of their assets to the state bond market in order to
increase gross expected return. Changes in fundamentals, which affect
expected payoff of bonds, result in a relatively bigger shift in the non-
residents' demand curve.
Using an imperfect information extension of the basic model, it was
shown that some stylized facts were still unexplained. In particular, the
share of net buyers among non-residents during main episodes of mar-
ket turbulence differed significantly from the share of net buyers among
residents. In other words, the theoretical model suggests that residents
and non-residents should behave differently on the aggregate level but
one should not observe differences on the individual level. The second
hypothesis was formulated to explain observed differences on the indi-
vidual level. Based on the specific structure of non-resident participants
in the GKO-OFZ market, which was distinguished by the presence of a
foreign market maker (a leader), we hypothesized that non-residents
imitate the market maker's actions and thus exhibit herding behavior.
This hypothesis was supported by empirical tests based on daily data on
investors' transactions. We found that herding behavior explained the
opposing strategies of residents and non-residents during the financial
turbulence of 1997–1998.
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1. THE GKO-OFZ MARKET:
ASSET STRUCTURE AND PARTICIPANTS
The state debt market was established for the purpose of providing do-
mestic financing for the federal deficit. Market financing was considered
a source of non-inflationary financing — an alternative to direct credits
from the Central Bank (CBR). The first bonds that were issued in May
1993 represented zero coupon bonds that promised to pay a predeter-
mined (face) value on a fixed date. These bonds were called state short-
term bonds (GKO). The maturity of the first issues was three months.
In 1995 the Finance Ministry (FinMin) began issuing federal variable cou-
pon bonds (OFZ-PK) with maturity of more than one year. During the
period of circulation, the FinMin paid coupons according to the prevailing
market level of interest rates. In 1996 the FinMin issued fixed coupon
bonds (OFZ-PD) to restructure its debt to the CBR that had accumulated
in 1992–1994. These bonds began to be quoted in the market only in
June 1997. By the time of the crisis, short-term bonds (GKOs) com-
prised the largest share of the state bond market (see Table 1).
Table 1. Structure of GKO-OFZ market (October 31, 1997).
Definition Maturity Market share*
GKO Zero coupon bonds No more than 1 year 81%
OFZ-PK Variable coupon bonds 2 years 12%
OFZ-PD Fixed coupon bonds 2–7 years   7%
* Market value, CBR not included.
The redemption of bonds and issue of new ones was carried out by the
FinMin regularly on Wednesdays. The pricing of new bonds was done by
means of a primary American-type auction. The participants of the auc-
tion submitted two types of orders: competitive, that included price and
quantity; and non-competitive, that is an intention to buy a stated volume
of securities at the average auction price. The FinMin determined the cut
price and accepted orders with bidding prices higher than the cut price.
The parameters of the issue were disclosed in advanced; however, the
volumes of the issue were common knowledge only after the auction.
Apart from primary auctions, there existed a secondary market for state
bonds in which trade was fully computerized and carried out in the Mos-
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cow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX). Due to the paperless nature
of the securities, the only way to buy or sell securities was to participate
in the secondary market, that is, in the MICEX. In this secondary market,
buy/sell orders were of two types; however, there existed certain restric-
tions that will be mentioned below.
All the participants in the GKO-OFZ market can be divided into the fol-
lowing four major categories: the state (CBR and the FinMin), non-
residents, dealers, and other residents. Direct participants in trading
were dealers — institutions (mostly banks) that had signed a special
agreement with the CBR2 and thereby were permitted to directly partici-
pate in trading sessions. Some dealers signed another special agree-
ment with the CBR and were called primary dealers. The division be-
tween primary and other dealers began in 1996. The aim of singling out
primary dealers was to establish a two-level mechanism of market regu-
lation in which the CBR controls only a relatively small number of key
market participants.
Primary dealers had significant advantages over the others including the
exclusive right to submit orders with lasting terms, access to additional
refinancing facilities, and the right to take limited short positions. In every
transaction in the secondary market, the primary dealer was one of the
parties since an order placed by a market participant was matched by an
order previously placed by the primary dealer.
Primary dealers had additional obligations according to their role as mar-
ket regulators. Primary dealers were requested to participate in auctions
buying out certain volumes of new issues and in the secondary market to
maintain the liquidity of some securities or the market as a whole. Offi-
cially this took the form of an obligation to keep a certain bid/ask
spread, to maintain a minimum volume of selling and buying orders, and
to recover executed orders in time. In mid 1997, out of about 300 deal-
ers in the GKO-OFZ market, 43 were primary dealers.
The state was represented in the secondary market by the CBR and the
FinMin. The FinMin occasionally used the secondary market to sell addi-
tional papers and buy out previous issues if it was deemed to be optimal.
The CBR took active part in secondary trading, smoothing the yield curve
according to its short-term objectives. At the same time, the CBR also
intervened to maintain long-term liquidity. A clear example of such a
policy is the building up of the GKO-OFZ portfolio in March–June 1996,
right before the presidential elections, and again in November–Decem-
                                               
2 CBR was responsible for monitoring and regulating activity of GKO-OFZ market
participants.
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ber 1997 when the first external shock hit the domestic market. The CBR
was not legally able to participate in primary auctions; however, this task
was fulfilled by Sberbank — the largest state-owned bank. The CBR was
also responsible for monitoring and regulating the activity of GKO-OFZ
market participants. Open market operations departments monitored
trading in real time and spotted violations of explicit or implicit norms in
the trading process. Technically, the trading system allowed agreed
upon non-competitive transactions, that is transactions at a price far
from the market price, to be carried out. Participants responsible for
such transactions were warned and in some cases were temporary
banned from the trade sessions.
Non-residents were not allowed to invest in state bonds under the same
conditions as residents until 1998. The first non-residents were admitted
to the market in 1996 and were allowed to purchase securities only in
primary auctions where they settled non-competitive orders and they had
no right to participate in secondary trading. In fall 1996, non-residents
were admitted to the secondary market.
Until the end of 1997, certain restrictions existed on non-residents'
capital flows in and out of the market.3 A non-resident willing to invest in
the GKO had to exchange a certain fraction of invested funds directly via
the CBR. If the non-resident intended to withdraw funds from the market,
he was requested to inform the CBR in advance4 and to make a forward
deal with the CBR to exchange a certain share of withdrawn money at a
forward exchange rate. The forward exchange rate was determined in
such a way that the dollar yield on state bonds was set at a targeted
level. In 1996, the share of non-residents' funds subject to forward
transactions was 100%; however, it was gradually lowered, as were
minimum terms. Fig. 1 shows the time path of quantitative restrictions on
non-residents' capital outflows from the GKO-OFZ market.
In order to invest in state bonds, non-residents had to sign an agree-
ment with a dealer (primary, as a rule) that offered corresponding serv-
ices. An alternative way was to establish a branch institution in Russia,
which according to the law could be dealer or even primary dealer. For
instance, Credit Suisse First Boston had a daughter company that was a
primary dealer in the GKO-OFZ market. Despite the fact that non-dealers
could not directly participate in trading sessions, large clients were of-
                                               
3 The process of liberalization of the GKO-OFZ market is described in detail in
Vavilov et al. (1999).
4 The minimum term between the time of informing authorities about the intention
to withdraw funds and the time of the actual withdrawal was determined by
the CBR.
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fered terminals as a means by which they had direct access to secon-
dary trading. By the beginning of the crisis, the share of non-residents
in the GKO-OFZ market had grown to 40% (not including the CBR,
see Fig. 2).
Dealers, excluding Sberbank's dealers, held 25% of the market portfolio.
The market value of Sberbank's portfolio was larger than the portfolio
value of all the other dealers as a whole. The share of other residents
was less than 20%; however, they numbered over 40,000.
According to the official definition, non-residents were individuals having
permanent residence abroad or institutions that were created in accor-
dance with foreign legislation. However, this definition is not entirely ap-
propriate from the economic point of view since in practice not all non-
residents were 100% foreign-owned companies. Russian companies had
opportunities to establish daughter companies in other countries (off-
shores) in order to minimize their tax burden. The problem of tax burden
optimization became important after the FinMin began to tax interest in-
come on new issues from the GKO and OFZ starting from January 1997.
The tax rate was set at 15%. This measure did not affected investors that
were registered in countries with which Russia had a double taxation
treaty. Introduction of income tax stimulated Russian companies to reg-
ister offshore.
Cyprus was the most favorable country for Russian companies estab-
lishing an offshore company due to its low taxes and the double taxation
100%
1996                                      1997
Fig. 1. Liberalization of terms of investment for non-residents.
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treaty signed between Cyprus and Russia. Daughter structures of Rus-
sian companies and companies with Russian ownership existed not only
in Cyprus but also in republics of the former Soviet Union. About half of
all non-residents who invested in GKOs and OFZs were either residents
of Cyprus or residents of republics of the former Soviet Union. It would
be incorrect to consider all non-residents as a uniform group of inves-
tors, but unfortunately we have no information about the owners of the
companies that participated in the GKO-OFZ market (see data descrip-
tion). In order to exclude the possible influence of Russian-owned com-
panies when studying the behavior of non-residents, we did not take into
consideration investors who were registered in those countries (except
those companies about which we had reliable information).
Similar to Sberbank, whose portfolio was comparable with that of other
residents, there was one large non-resident investor both with respect to
size of portfolio and volume of market operations. Studying the behavior
of this particular investor would be interesting from the perspective of his
strategy. In particular, it would be interesting to know if this investor used
his market power to earn abnormal returns. Unfortunately, it is impossi-
ble to study the behavior of one large non-resident alone due to the
natural restriction formed by the confidentiality of information on actions
of single investors. Excluding this largest investor, about 80% of the total
portfolio of remaining non-residents (including Cyprus and republics
of the former Soviet Union) was concentrated within a group of British
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Fig. 2. Structure of the GKO–OFZ portfolio (end of October 1997). Shares
were calculated based on market value.
Sberbank, 34%
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investors. This can be easily explained by the fact that the headquarters
of many largest investment banks whose business is spread around the
world are located in London. The group of British investors was relatively
small; about 30 companies covered more than 90% of the market.
2. DID NON-RESIDENTS DESTABILIZE
THE GKO-OFZ MARKET?
Investors could purchase and sell state bonds in the primary (auctions)
and secondary (trade) market. The secondary market was the main
segment where price tendency was formed. The orders of investors in
primary auctions generally contained prices that approximately corre-
sponded to the market price of the analogous bond on the day pro-
ceeding the day of the auction. For the purpose of comparing behavior
of residents and non-residents, we used daily data on investors' net po-
sition in the secondary market during the period of crisis. Since non-
residents were professional investors, it is natural to compare their be-
havior with that of Russian professional participants, most of whom were
dealers. Our first step is to check the allegation that non-residents de-
stabilized the GKO-OFZ market during the period of crisis. This state-
ment will be supported if we show that during most of the trading days
when the market price went down, non-residents were net sellers as a
group and residents were net buyers.
Let N+R– denote the event in which residents are net sellers as a group
and non-residents are net buyers. We will consider only those daily ob-
servations in which net position of residents and non-residents differed
in sign. Hence, by definition we consider only those days when one of
two above-mentioned events occurred. The period of crisis contains 158
observations, of which 124 satisfy this condition. Using data on investors'
transactions, it is straightforward to calculate the sample probability of
event N–R+ based on the restricted set of observations
05.055.0)(Pr ±=+−RNestimate .
The estimate and its standard deviation do not suggest that non-
residents were net sellers more frequently than residents. However, this
fact does not allow us to reject the hypothesis of the destabilizing be-
havior of non-residents. Let us show that non-residents were net sellers
more frequently in periods of falling prices, that is,
+−RNPr( | >α−<∆ )p +−RNPr( | )α−>∆p , (1)
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where 1
1
−=∆
−
p
p
p  and α — some positive number.
Table 2. Test of the hypothesis of the destabilizing behavior of non-residents.
α N(∆p < –α) N(∆p > –α) Pr(NR | ∆p < –α) Pr(NR | ∆p > –α) Significance
0.0% 65 59 0.63 0.47 2.86%
0.5% 52 72 0.71 0.45 0.10%
1.0% 37 86 0.78 0.45 0.01%
Note: N(.) denotes the number of observations that satisfy the condition in parentheses. The
last column contains the significance level of the test of inequality (1).
As it follows, inequality (1) holds with good probability, which suggests
that non-residents tended to sell more frequently in periods of falling
prices than in periods of rising prices. As a price index we used
100/1
1
GKOi+
,
where iGKO stands for the GKO yield index.5 It should be noted that the
frequency of selling by non-residents grows as threshold α rises. This
fact suggests that for most extreme episodes of GKO-OFZ market tur-
bulence, non-residents were generally net-sellers and residents were net
buyers. To sum up, we conclude that the hypothesis of the destabilizing
behavior of non-residents is supported.
3. BEHAVIOR OF NON-RESIDENTS: HYPOTHESES
Studying the behavior of international investors has gained interest rela-
tively recently and is related to studying the problem of financial market
globalization. The last wave of financial crises in 1997–1998 that hit
mainly recently growing emerging market economies is viewed as being
caused by the adverse behavior of international investors. Among widely
accepted facts is that a financial crisis is preceded by a period of signifi-
cant capital inflow, which is then sharply reversed (Calvo, 1998). In the
previous section, we established that non-residents destabilized the
                                               
5 Use of any other yield indicator would not affect the results since prices of all is-
sues were changing proportionally.
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GKO-OFZ market during the period of crisis. Let us consider the follow-
ing four hypotheses that explain this fact:
1. Destabilizing behavior is explained by non-residents' being less in-
formed about Russian market fundamentals than residents;
2. Non-residents imitated each other actions (herding behavior);
3. Non-residents' strategy was determined not only by the information
about the Russian market, but also by events taking place abroad;
4. Non-residents' reaction to worsening fundamentals was stronger due
to generally more attractive alternative investment opportunities.
Calvo and Mendoza (1999), using a simple model of portfolio investment,
show that with a growing number of independent markets the incentives
to collect information about specific markets are diminishing. This state-
ment is most obviously true in the extreme case when the number of in-
dependent markets is very large. Indeed, since the global portfolio is
risk-free, any effort to reduce specific market risk is not rational. Bren-
nan and Cao (1996) show that the optimal strategy of foreign investors,
provided they are comparatively less informed, is to buy securities when
prices are going up and sell when prices are down. This type of strategy
is called positive feedback strategy since it creates positive feedback
between prices and investors' actions leading to multiplication of the ini-
tial shock. Obviously, such a strategy may destabilize a financial market
via overreaction of prices to a change in fundamentals. Empirically, the
hypothesis of non-residents' following a positive feedback strategy was
found to be supported in the case of the Korean stock market in period
before and during the 1997 crisis (Kim and Wei, 1999 in contrast to
Choe et al., 1998). In the case of the GKO-OFZ market, the assumption
of non-residents' being less informed than residents does not seem to
be justified. The major foreign capital flows went through a limited num-
ber of well known global investment funds with significant exposure in
the Russian market, whose traders we can not consider as relatively less
informed market participants.
Herding behavior is a phenomenon of a market with imperfect informa-
tion and behavioral externalities. One of the most popular explanations of
herding behavior in financial markets is the particular structure of incen-
tives that are faced by managers of investment funds which give rise to
payoff externalities (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). Managers are inter-
ested in maximizing expected payoffs, which depend on the assessment
of their relative rather than absolute success (principal-agent problem).
This type of payoff scheme is called a benchmark-based compensation
scheme. Even in the case of having positive information about the mar-
ket, the manager may decide to sell its portfolio, following the actions of
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others, since in that way he will be at least not worse off than the others.
Another possible explanation of herding behavior is the existence of a
large investor — a leader whose actions produce information externalities
for others. Calvo (1999) argues that a crisis may be launched by the ac-
tions of a large nonresident (informed investor). Suppose that due to
losses in other markets or the need to meet margin calls such an inves-
tor sells assets in some financial market. Other investors (uninformed)
who observe his actions may interpret his behavior as a signal of weak-
ening fundamentals and follow him in selling securities. The hypothesis
of herding behavior should be considered as one of many possible ex-
planations for the difference in behavior between residents and
non-residents since it can not be excluded that key non-residents had
information about each others' actions. A survey of the literature on
herding behavior in financial markets is given in (Bikhchandani and
Sharma, 2000)
Foreign participants in the GKO-OFZ market were international investors.
The portfolios of such companies were composed of financial instru-
ments issued in different markets. Consequently, their investment in
each market is the outcome of a complex optimization problem. A
change in the conditions in one of the markets should necessarily result
in the redistribution of their assets among all the markets. Schinasi and
Smith (1999) show that if the return of a leveraged portfolio on a unit of
capital is less than the costs of financing, then the optimal strategy is to
reduce debt and correspondingly reduce positions in all risky markets.
This result leads to the conclusion that a reduction in expected return in
world markets or an increase in interest rates in industrial countries may
have led to the reduction of the number of foreign investors' positions in
the Russian market. Thereby, the destabilizing behavior of non-residents
can be explained by the influence of external markets. This argument
implies that Russian investors did not consider outflow of foreign capital
as a permanent reduction in external demand for state bonds. Otherwise
residents should have also reduced their demand and the final redistri-
bution of the market supply between investors' groups should have been
ambiguous.
Personen (1998) investigated the relationship between the Russian stock
market and world stock markets for the period of 1997–1998. The influ-
ence of Asian markets proved to be insignificant and a significant oppo-
site causality from the Russian stock market to East-Asia financial mar-
kets was found. At the same time, a simple Granger causality test
suggests that American and Japanese stock markets significantly af-
fected the prices of Russian stocks.
The difference in behavior between non-residents and residents can
be explained by the different investment conditions. Due to a large set of
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financial instruments that are available across the world to large invest-
ment banks, these companies have opportunities to significantly reduce
the risk of their assets. Suppose that the worsening of fundamentals,
such as a fall in world energy prices, increases the probability of the
state being unable to fully service its obligations under the current ex-
change rate regime. It seems to be reasonable to suppose that non-
residents having more attractive investment opportunities would react
more actively by reducing their demand for state bonds. If this intuition is
correct, then in order to explain the difference in behavior between resi-
dents and non-residents it is not necessary to resort to imperfect market
arguments or the influence of world financial markets. This hypothesis
seems to be a good starting point in the analysis of investors' behavior
during the period of the Russian crisis. The hypothesis does not have
immediate implications for its empirical testing so we need to construct a
formal model. This model should also formalize the argument of the
overreaction of non-residents to changes in fundamentals.
4. A MODEL OF A FINANCIAL MARKET
WITH TWO TYPES OF INVESTORS
Let us consider the following simple two-period model of a financial mar-
ket with two types of investors, residents and non-residents. We assume
for simplicity that there is one type of discount bond that is traded in the
market. The bond takes the form of an obligation to pay 1 ruble after
some sufficiently long time period (T). The purpose of the model is to
study the effect of external shock on the allocation of bonds between in-
vestors. The period immediately prior to the shock we denote as period
0, and the period immediately after the shock we call period 1. By as-
sumption, the duration of the shock is short enough that we can con-
sider bonds in period 0 and 1 as identical (T >> 1). We assume that all
the available investment opportunities are the same kind of obligations
with the same maturity (T). Suppose that the dollar exchange rate is
fixed one to one in both period 0 and period 1; however, it is uncertain if
the exchange rate will be kept fixed at the same level until the time
of the bonds' maturity. Hence, the amount of repayments in dollar value
by the end of the bond circulation period is a random variable that has
a normal conditional distribution in periods t = 0, 1 with mean and
variance (qt, 
2
tδ ). The pair of mean and variance we call market funda-
mentals, which are assumed exogenous. For the sake of simplicity, as-
sume q0 = 1.
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In each period of time investors allocate their assets between two types
of financial instruments. The first are discount bonds that are traded in
the market, which is a common form of investment available to both
groups of investors. In period t the mean and the variance of the dollar
yield of the bond to the date of maturity are equal to rt = qt/pt – 1 and
222 / ttt pδ=σ , where pt is the market price of the bond. The second fi-
nancial instrument represents a set of all available alternative investment
opportunities modeled as one security with mean and variance of return
by the same date: (rr, 
2
rσ ) for residents and (rn, 
2
nσ ) for non-residents.
We assume that investors within each group are identical. Demand for
bonds in each period is a result of utility optimization under uncertainty.
Investors maximize an expected utility function of the following type:
2σγ−= irU ,        i = r or n. (2)
This type of expected utility can be derived from the constant relative
risk aversion utility function under an assumption of normality.
Let us introduce the following notation:
ωrt — share of assets allocated by representative resident to the bond
market in period t = 0, 1;
ωnt — share of assets allocated by representative non-resident to the
bond market in period t = 0, 1;
Art — total value of residents' assets in period t = 0, 1;
Ant — total value of non-residents' assets in period t = 0, 1.
In both periods of time t = 0, 1 the market reaches equilibrium which
means that price pt takes a positive value such that excess demand for
bonds by residents and non-residents sum to zero. By this statement we
assume that the supply of bonds is absolutely inelastic with respect to
the price. Additional assumptions are the following:
• the returns on alternative assets are independent of return on the
discount bond;
• the optimization problem for residents and non-residents always has
an internal solution.
The assumption about the independence of returns on alternative finan-
cial instruments available to non-residents and of returns on the bond
seems to be justified. However, we can not make a similar assumption
for the case of residents since a significant part of the bond risk was risk
of ruble devaluation that was also part of risk associated with other ruble
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financial instruments. This means that the dollar yield of alternative fi-
nancial instruments should correlate with the return on the bond. Never-
theless, we are still able to neglect this correlation if we keep in mind
that the share of residents' assets invested in bonds and the variation of
bond returns have different meanings. Let ξ and η denote random vari-
ables that are returns on alternative investment for residents and returns
on the bond. Then random variables ξ and ζ = αξ + η are independent,
where
0
)(
),(
<ξ
ηξ
−=α
Var
Cov
.
Consequently, we can assume that the bond return is equal to ζ since
the optimal portfolio can also be written as a linear combination of two
independent factors. Let us show that its variance is less than the vari-
ance of ξ, and the actual share of residents' assets invested in bonds ω'
is less than the share obtained from solving the problem of allocating as-
sets between two independent instruments that have returns ξ and ζ (ω).
Note that the last statement easily follows from α < 0.
)()(),()(),()1()()( η<η+αηξ=η+ηξα++ξα=ζ VarVarCovVarCovVarVar .
Hence further in the text where we discuss the theoretical implications,
we will take into account that actual data on the share of residents' as-
sets invested in GKOs underestimates the theoretical counterpart, and
the actual variance of return is higher than the one considered in the
model.
The next proposition characterizes the direction of allocating bonds
after  a  very  slight  worsening  of  fundamentals  dq = q1 – q2 < 0  or
020
2
1
2 >δ−δ=δd .6 The simplifying assumption about infinite change was
made for reasons that will become evident in the next section. Simula-
tions suggest that the proposition holds also for large external shocks.
Proposition 1.
If worsening in fundamentals leads to a decrease in market price then.
1). If ]))(,(max41[ 22 nrnnr σ+σγγ+ω>ω , dq = 0 and dδ2 > 0, then in pe-
riod 1 bonds are allocated from residents to non-residents.
                                               
6 We use notation dq or dδ2 to emphasize that we consider sufficiently small
changes in fundamentals.
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2) If
r
n
nr γ
γ
ω>>ω ,
dδ2 = 0 and dq < 0, then provided condition
r
r
r
ω−
ω+
σ<σ
1
122
holds, in period 1 bonds are allocated from residents to non-residents
and in the case
r
r
r
ω−
ω+
σ>σ
1
122 ,
bonds are allocated from non-residents to residents.
Proof: see Appendix 1.
The assumption that the share of non-residents' assets invested in GKOs
was rather small or at least much less than the share of residents' assets
(adjusted for the coefficient of risk aversion) reflects a broader range of
alternative investment opportunities available to non-residents and is jus-
tified by the actual data. Indeed, the total value of assets of foreign GKO
holders was several trillion dollars and the value of non-residents' portfo-
lios of state bonds was some 20 billion dollars. To get an idea of how re-
alistic is the condition of the first statement in Proposition 1, assume that
the share of bonds in residents' total assets is equal to 0.3, and the
same share for non-residents is 0.01. Let us assume that the standard
deviation of returns on bonds as well as alternative non-residents' assets
is not greater than 10 percentage points. Then in order for the condition
to hold, the maximum of two parameters of risk aversion should not be
greater than 362. Let us consider the following example in order to ob-
tain an estimate of the coefficient of risk aversion. Assume that the
portfolio risk (standard deviation of return) increases by 1 percentage
point or formally σ2 – σ1 = 0.01. At the same time the expected return
also goes up to keep utility constant or )( 21
2
212 σ−σγ=− rr . It seems jus-
tified to assume that with a probability of less than 95%, the new portfo-
lio return will exceed the old portfolio return since otherwise it is unlikely
that an investor considers the two portfolios as equivalent. Formally, this
can be written as 21
2
212 2 σ+σ≤− rr . Using the previous equality, we ar-
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rive at the following estimate of the coefficient of risk aversion:
200
2
2
12
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
=
σ−σ
≤
σ−σ
σ+σ
≤γ .
As it follows from Proposition 1, in period 1 bonds are allocated from
non-residents to residents only when alternative investment opportunities
available to residents are risky enough. Note that with a growing share of
residents' assets invested in bonds this condition becomes stronger. In-
deed falling prices significantly reduce the assets of residents if the
share is not very small and consequently contribute to further reduction
of their demand for bonds.
The result presented in the second part of Proposition 1 can be inter-
preted the following way. In the case when the variance of residents' al-
ternative investment is not large, then the small share of nonresidents
assets' invested in bonds (ωn) accounts for the relatively weaker sensi-
tivity of their demand with respect to a change in expected payoff. How-
ever unlike the demand sensitivity to a change in risk, with ωn going to
zero, the sensitivity of non-residents' demand with respect to the ex-
pected payoff does not go to zero as well. With a sufficiently large vari-
ance in residents' alternative investment )( 2rσ , their priorities shift from
maximization of expected returns to reduction of risk. Hence, sensitivity
of residents' demand for bonds with respect to a change in expected
payoff goes down. In particular, if ωr ≤ 0.5 and 1.7σ < σr, then the oppo-
site is true, that is, the effect of the presence of richer alternative in-
vestment opportunities available to non-residents dominates the effect of
a small share of their assets in bonds.
It seems natural to assume that the variance of returns on non-residents'
alternative investment is less than the variance of returns on bonds due
to sophisticated risk diversification. Further in the text, we assume that
the share of residents' assets in bonds is less than 50%. This assump-
tion implies that the utility of investment in bonds is lower than the utility
of investment in alternative instruments. In particular, from 22 rσ<σ
it follows that rr > r. According to the consolidated balance sheet of t
he banking system (Sberbank excluded), the share (in book value) of
state bonds of banks' assets was about 7% and the same share for
Sberbank — the largest GKO-OFZ holder — was less than 30%. However,
we should keep in mind that in the case of correlation of returns, the
actual share is lower than the direct analog of the theoretical notion.
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The condition 
r
r
r
ω−
ω+
σ>σ
1
122  is justified if we assume that the economy is
characterized by high investment risk. Indeed, the variance of returns on
alternative investment available to residents is a measure of the risk of
investment in the domestic economy. Taking this into account we can
reformulate Proposition 1 in the following way. In financial markets of
countries with high investment risk, non-residents will contribute to the
market's reaction to worsening fundamentals if it is mainly related to a
reduction in expected payoff. A clear example of this kind of shock is in-
creased devaluation expectations.
Statement 1 provides formal ground for the intuitively accepted hypothe-
sis that a shift in the demand curve of non-residents after worsened fun-
damentals is greater than that of residents. This statement, however,
does not produce any implications that can be used to check if the
asymmetrical effect of changes in fundamentals is responsible for the
observed opposing strategies of residents and non-residents. The simple
full information model that was used to prove this statement is highly
stylized since it does not allow for differences in assessment of market
perspectives by investors. In practice investors have different percep-
tions about the attractiveness of investment in bonds which, roughly
speaking, means separation of the market participants between optimists
and pessimists. If non-residents and residents are not different with re-
spect to the quality of information they receive, then the ratio between
optimistic and pessimistic investors should be the same for both groups.
The differences among investors in assessing the market perspective,
which interferes with the difference in available alternative investment
opportunities, makes less obvious the conclusion drawn from the sim-
plest model. In particular it is not clear if in a general case of heteroge-
neity of investors we still can expect that in some rather probable cir-
cumstances non-residents generally tend to sell and residents tend to
buy bonds in the case of worsening fundamentals. It may well be the
case that this conclusion is valid for the extreme case of full information.
It can be easily shown that it is also true for another extreme case of
highly imperfect information. Indeed, let us consider a slightly different
scenario that allows for imperfect information in the model. Suppose that
in period 0 all investors had full information about market fundamentals.
In period 1 the financial shock hit the market. It is not known if the shock
is permanent (fundamentals changed) or temporal (fundamentals un-
changed). In another extreme case when investors do not have any reli-
able information about a change in fundamentals, they all give equal
probabilities to both possibilities (fundamentals worsened and funda-
mentals remained unchanged) and consequently are not different with
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respect to received information (no information). In this case, the differ-
ence in alternative investment opportunities naturally leads to opposing
strategies of residents and non-residents. Let us consider an extension
of the basic model that incorporates the scenario just described.
Assume that in the case of a permanent shock, fundamentals change
from (1, δ2) to (q, δ2) (q < 1). We also assume that each investor inde-
pendent of his type correctly determines the true type of shock with
probability π > 1/2, which is common knowledge. The new model re-
quires a slight change in notations. As
1
1
−=
p
q
r
we denote the mean return if shock is permanent n during, as
1
1
1
0 −= p
r
— the mean return if shock is temporary. situation when. We will say that
an investor is optimistic if he considers the shock to be temporary.
The return on the bond expected by an optimistic investor is
r + = πr0 + (1 – π)r. (3)
The return on the bond expected by a pessimistic investor is
r – = πr + (1 – π)r0. (4)
Similarly let us introduce the following notation for the expected value of
repayments:
q+ = π + (1 – π)q,    q– = πq + (1 – π). (6)
)(
)(
−+
rnx  — Share of non-residents (residents) that received positive (nega-
tive) signal.
Further in the text superscripts "+" and "–" will be used to show that the
variable corresponds to optimists and pessimists. It is straightforward
to show that optimists expect the bond payoff to be q+, and pessimists
expect q–. As in the previous section, we consider infinitely small
changes in fundamentals. Since we are interested in the case when in
equilibrium non-residents are supposed to sell bonds to residents, we
consider only specific types of shocks that affect only the expected pay-
off dq = q – 1 < 0, leaving its variance unchanged.
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Proposition 2.
If the number of residents and non-residents is very large, worsening in
fundamentals leads to a decrease in market price and the following con-
ditions hold:
r
n
r
n ωγ
γ
≤ω ,    ωr ≤ 0.5,    
r
r
r
ω−
ω+
σ>σ
1
122
and
π
π−−π
<−
)1)(12(
rrr ; (7)
then the share of buyers among residents and non-residents in period 1
is the same.
Proof: see Appendix 2.
Proposition 2 describes the comparative behavior of investors. Using a
simple model it was shown that only under some conditions can selling
by non-residents and buying by residents be explained using the argu-
ment of differing alternative investment opportunities. However as it was
shown in Proposition 2, under some additional conditions (7) there
should be no difference between the share of buyers in the two groups.
The idea of this result is that non-residents and residents are different
with respect to their intensities of buying and selling but not with respect
to their relations between buyers and sellers.
Let us assess how realistic is condition (7). In Fig. 3 we illustrate the
function
π
π−−π )1)(12(
in the plane (r – rr, π).
Since theoretical returns correspond to the period of bond circulation,
the real-life analog of it is a period of one year. Indeed, more then 80%
of state bonds were GKOs with a period of circulation of no more than
one year (see Table 1). As it follows from the graph, if the quality of in-
formation is not extremely poor or perfect (probability is not close to 0.5
and 1), then condition (7) does not hold only when the expected return
differential is significant. Indeed, for example, if π = 0.7 then the differ-
ential should be greater than 17 percentage points on an annual basis.
In the reality of the Russian economic crisis, this would mean the exis-
FINANCIAL CRISIS IN RUSSIA: THE BEHAVIOR OF NON-RESIDENTS24
tence of significantly more profitable (from the expected return perspec-
tive) investment opportunities. Obviously any judgements about the real-
ness of this situation have subjective bias. However it seems highly unre-
alistic that under conditions of no economic growth (0.4% in 1997),
investment in the economy could not have a high average (dollar) return.
The imperfect information variant of the model was simulated using
some reasonable values for exogenous parameters. The most important
conclusion is that a very small change in expected payoff drives the so-
lution for pessimistic non-residents to the boundary. This result has a
simple explanation. Since the share of non-residents' assets invested in
bonds is very small, any slight change in expected return may drive the
solution for the optimal share to the negative domain. For this reason, in
the case of full information, a change of fundamentals does not affect
expected return in equilibrium and all solutions remain internal. In the
case of imperfect information, non-residents differ with respect to per-
ceived fundamentals and hence the expected return can not be the
same. If the change of fundamentals is very small, then the optimal solu-
tion for pessimistic non-residents is still internal, meaning that the as-
sumption of a very small change seems to be important but at the same
time unrealistic.
It is obvious that reality is much more complicated and can not be fully
captured by this type of stylized model. Judging from the data, we con-
clude that a key group of non-residents held a non-empty GKO-OFZ
portfolio throughout the period of crisis and no one fully exited the mar-
20%
0.50      0.58      0.66       0.74      0.82             Probability
Expected return differential
16%
12%
8%
4%
0%
Fig. 3. Condition (7) holds below the curve.
4. A MODEL OF A FINANCIAL MARKET WITH TWO TYPES OF INVESTORS 25
ket. One possible reason is restricted market liquidity. In our stylized
model prices always clear the market and each investor holds a small
portion of the market portfolio. Hence one should interpret obtained re-
sults cautiously taking into account the stylized nature of assumptions.
The model helps us to understand what the picture would be if liquidity
was perfect. In order to derive real-life implications, we should think
about how liquidity constraints could have changed the model result. The
lack of market liquidity effects mostly the actions of those investors who
intend to sell bonds. Hence, one can expect that this factor should di-
minish the intensity of selling which means that the difference between
residents and non-residents with respect to the share of net buyers
should be even less pronounced. This argument allows us to use model
implications to test the hypothesis that the existence of different alterna-
tive investment opportunities is a sufficient explanation of the observed
empirical dissimilarities in investors' behavior.
Data.
The data on transactions in the GKO-OFZ market were collected on a
daily basis by the Open Market Operations Department of the Bank of
Russia. This data set is rather huge having several megabytes of data
per day and contains information on all transactions and orders of each
investor according to his ID, including the exact time, codes of securi-
ties, etc. A separate file provides deciphered information about these IDs
including information on the name of each investor and the country of
residence. Unfortunately, this is the only information about investors that
we have. The major problem with the data set was that it was not organ-
ized as a database but rather represented as a data archive. Several
programs were written that helped organize the database.
Another difficulty that we faced when working with these data files was
that one non-resident investor could enter the GKO-OFZ market via sev-
eral dealers and thereby have several IDs. This problem was solved by
investigating the names of investors and by grouping investors according
to their names rather than IDs. In this way the database was constructed
and contains daily data for November 1997 – August 1998. In order for
the database to be easily processed, we decided not to include all resi-
dents but only dealers.7 Since non-residents were professional investors,
it seemed reasonable to compare their behavior with similar counterparts
among resident investors, of which dealers represented the most active
and professional part.
                                               
7 Total number of residents exceeded 40,000.
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The database is a Microsoft Access file of about 500 Mb in size. For
each non-resident investor and dealer, the database contains information
on their end-of-week portfolios (nominal and market), portfolio duration,
volume of bonds sold (nominal value, market value, units), volume of
bonds bought (nominal value, market value, units), duration of sold and
bought bonds. When calculating daily sell and buy figures we excluded
REPO transactions between dealers and the CBR. These transactions
took place off market and did not affect prices. REPO was primarily a re-
financing instrument and state bonds were used as collateral.
5. TESTING MODEL IMPLICATIONS
Implications of the extended model can be used for the practical testing
of the hypothesis that the existence of different alternative investment
opportunities is a sufficient explanation for the observed empirical dis-
similarities in investors' behavior. The null hypothesis is that the differ-
ence in behavior between residents and non-residents was solely due to
different alternative investment opportunities. The idea of the test is to
compare shares of investors within each group that increased their
portfolios (nominal value portfolio rose) during a certain period of time.
Theory suggests that if the null hypothesis is correct, then we will not
find a statistically significant difference between these shares. In order to
satisfy model conditions we should consider periods of time that corre-
spond to the transition of the market from one equilibrium to another.
This choice, however, can not be strictly formalized. In Fig. 4 we showed
five main episodes of market turbulence which we considered as relevant
periods for the analysis.
We could not assume that the share of non-residents that increased their
portfolios over a certain period (buying non-residents) was normally dis-
tributed since the number of non-residents was not sufficiently large (see
Table 3). The appropriate methodology is a little bit more complicated
than the simple t-test of mean difference. Since the number of dealers
was sufficiently large (over 200), following the Central limit theorem we
assumed that the share of buying dealers was a normally distributed
random variable. We did not observe the underlying probability of pur-
chase but we have its estimate by observing the share of buyers within
the group of dealers. Let us denote this estimate as ς. Then ς = p + ε,
where p is the underlying probability and ε is the normally distributed
random variable with zero mean and variance σ2. Note that the variance
of ε being equal to p(1 – p)/Nr (Nr — number of observed dealers) can
be quite accurately estimated if you substitute p with its estimate ς. In
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this case the underlying probability can be represented as a normally
distributed random variable p = ς – ε with known mean and variance. Let
Kn be the number of buyers among Nn observed non-residents. If an
episode corresponds to the fall of prices, then the relevant alternative to
the null hypothesis is that the share of net buyers among non-residents
was significantly less than the share of net buyers among residents. The
critical probability of the test can be obtained by calculating the prob-
ability (under null hypothesis) that the share of buyers b among non-
residents would be less than the observed Kn/Nn condition on known es-
timate ς:
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In the case of one episode corresponding to market recovery, the rele-
vant alternative is that the share of net buyers among non-residents
would be greater than the share of net buyers among residents. Hence,
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Fig. 4. Time path of GKO prices: major episodes of market
turbulence.
Definition of episodes: 22.01.98–30.01.98; 5.05.98–28.05.98;
23.06.98–10.08.98; 13.07.98–21.07.98; 4.08.98–14.08.98.
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we should use one minus value calculated by formula (8) to access sig-
nificance of the test.
Heterogeneity of investors can potentially result in the validation of the
null hypothesis using the test based on a full sample of investors, even if
a difference exists between key residents and non-residents. In order to
rule out any possible misleading effects of investors who had insignifi-
cant impact on the market balance, we also tested the null hypothesis
using a restricted sample of investors. For each episode under consid-
eration, we singled out those whose portfolios changed the most in ab-
solute terms from the whole sample of non-residents and dealers. We
restricted our choice to a group of investors for which the total sum of
these absolute values exceeded 99% of the sum across all samples of
investors. By doing this, we excluded those investors whose total effect
on the market balance was relatively insignificant.
As it is evident from test results for the case of the reduced sample of
investors are much more Table 3, the convincing than for the case of the
full sample. The null hypothesis was rejected with good probability for
each episode except the second one. Interestingly, exclusion of investors
from Cyprus (for which we do not have information that they were not
100% foreign) increased the significance of the test for each episode
except the first one (see the last row). This result provides evidence in
favor of the hypothesis that a significant share of investors from Cyprus
were Russian offshore companies.
6. DID NOT RESIDENTS HERD?
One of the hypotheses that was put forward to explain the difference in
behavior between residents and non-residents was the hypothesis of
herding behavior. The notion of herding behavior implies that investors
rationally imitate the actions of each other or some specific agent, pos-
sibly ignoring their own private information. Imitation can take different
forms and in practice it is almost impossible to statistically distinguish
between two sources of group behavior: imitation and common informa-
tion. The simplest case of herding behavior is the imitation of observed
actions of a large investor (leader) that is supposedly better informed
than others. In the case of the GKO-OFZ market we can easily single out
the largest non-residents who differed from others with respect to both
the size of portfolio and volume of secondary market operations (see
Fig. 5). In fact, we do not know for sure that non-residents observed the
behavior of the largest non-resident but this does not seem to be unre-
alistic provided that the group of key non-residents consisted of a rela-
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tively small number of investors. It is known that Russian traders of large
foreign institutions communicated with each other and this could have
been one way of spreading information between non-residents.
The idea behind testing the hypothesis is to estimate the effect of the
actions of the largest non-resident on the behavior of other non-
residents. This is not an easy task since we need to study the disaggre-
gated behavior of investors. The dynamic specification of actions of in-
Table 3. Test of the hypothesis of no difference in buyers' ratio between resi-
dents and non-residents.
Episode 1 2 3
100% 99% 100% 99% 100% 99%
Non-res. 0.59
(33/56)
0.49
(22/45)
0.62
(72/116)
0.53
(36/68)
0.44
(54/124)
0.24
(15/63)
Dealers 0.62
(150/242)
0.61
(64/105)
0.61
(160/262)
0.61
(77/127)
0.47
(122/261)
0.37
(47/128)
Cyprus 0.58
(1/12)
... 0.71
(27/38)
... 0.56
(27/48)
...
Incl. Cyprus 0.37 0.07*** 0.62 0.12 0.27 0.02**
Excl. Cyprus 0.40 ... 0.31 ... 0.03 ...
Episode 4 5
100% 99% 100% 99%
Non-res. 0.44
(43/97)
0.47
(24/51)
0.49
(46/94)
0.32
(16/50)
Dealers 0.30
(73/244)
0.15
(14/95)
0.52
(127/242)
0.47
(61/129)
Cyprus 0.47
(18/38)
... 0.73
(27/37)
...
Incl. Cyprus 0.00* 0.00* 0.28 0.02**
Excl. Cyprus 0.01** ... 0.00*** ...
Note: 99% corresponds to results obtained for a reduced sample of market participants. In
parentheses we show the number of buyers and the total number of observed investors from
the corresponding group. The estimated share is given above in parentheses. The last two
rows contain probabilities calculated from (8) for four episodes of market decline and one mi-
nus this value for the one episode of market recovery. */**/*** indicates significance at
90%/95%/99%, respectively.
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vestors we borrowed from Welch (1999); however, we applied it to a
different type of test. Welch (1999) studies the behavior of market ana-
lysts who supposedly tend to herd by following market consensus. Our
task is to explain the difference in the behavior between the two groups
of investors by providing evidence that investors from one of these
groups imitate the actions of the leader.
Let us first describe the general form of the statistical model. The model
specification assumes that investors follow discrete actions according to
the Markov switching process. Suppose that in each period of time an
investor can be in three states:8 "buy", "sell", "indifferent". Each state is
assigned one of three numbers: 1 (buy), 0 (indifferent), –1 (sell). There
exists a matrix of unconditional transition probabilities }{ 0ijp  where 
0
ijp  is
the ex ante probability of transition from state i to state j between any
two periods of time. These probabilities measure the uncertainty of
individual decisions, which can not be attributed to common factors. Let
ρt ∈ [–1, 1] denote the time series of common factors that affect inves-
tors' choices. In any period the matrix of conditional probabilities of tran-
sition between states is a function of the matrix of unconditional prob-
abilities and external variable ρt, which stands for common factors. The
                                               
8 In Welch (1999) states are recommendations of analysts that take five values
from "strong sell" to "strong buy".
Value of portfolio
Total volume of transactions
The leader
Fig. 5. Comparison of the leader with other non-residents.
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functional relationship was borrowed from Welch (1999):
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here i, j = –1, 0, 1, 0ijp  — unconditional transition probabilities.
Parameter θt, which may be time dependent, measures the degree of in-
fluence of common factors on transition probabilities. Obviously, the big-
ger is θt, the more weight is given to the probability of the state, which is
closer to the value of the external variable. There are two important
problems with the practical implementation of any kind of test based on
a general specification (9):
1. investors actions are not characterized by discrete variables;
2. investors are not homogeneous (for instance, they differ with respect
to speculative activity).
The simplest approach to resolve the first problem is to assume that an
investor is in the "sell" state if the value of securities sold during the
corresponding day exceeds the value of securities bought. Similarly, the
investor is considered to be in the "buy" state if the value of securities
purchased exceeds the value of securities sold. If the investor does not
participate in the market over the period under consideration, then he is
assumed to be the "indifferent" state. This approach has a number of
disadvantages that are related to non-homogeneity of market partici-
pants. One may suppose that investors were different with respect to
their extent of involvement in market speculation. Some investors per-
manently purchased and sold securities which did not necessarily reveal
their preferences with respect to increasing or reducing their portfolios.
This is especially true if we consider short time intervals such as trading
days. Suppose that an investor is actively involved in market speculation,
selling and purchasing securities simultaneously. Most probably due to
the dynamic nature of the process, the difference between value of sold
and bought securities is different from zero over the trading day even if
he is not inclined to change the volume of his portfolio. However, ac-
cording to the above stated approach we will have to assume him to be
either in the "buy" or "sell" state. Let us consider another investor who
is not involved in market speculation and participates in the market only
if he intends to change the volume of his portfolio. Obviously, the latter
investor will be in the "indifferent" state more frequently than the former,
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and it would be incorrect to assume equal transition probabilities when
modeling their behavior.
A straightforward modification of the approach is to assume that an in-
vestor is in the "sell" ("buy") state if the value of sold (purchased) secu-
rities "noticeably" exceeds the value of purchased (sold) ones. In order
to correctly define the term "noticeably," let us consider some number
α ∈ [0, 1] and define the states in the following way:
αB > S — an investor is in the "buy" state (1);
αS > B — an investor is in the "sell" state (0);
α ≤ S/B ≤1/α — an investor is in the "indifferent" state (1/2).
Here B and S are values of securities bought and sold correspondingly.
Choice of parameter α, which ranges from 0 to 1, affects the results of
model estimation. The parameter should be chosen in such a way that
investors are reasonably homogeneous with respect to their activity in
the market. Denote as kta  the variable that characterizes the actions of
investor k in trading day t:
k
ta  = 1, if α
k
tB >
k
tS ,
k
ta  = –1, if α
k
tS >
k
tB  and
k
ta  = 0 in other cases.
Suppose that we estimated transition probabilities by calculating their
sample counterparts or by using the maximum likelihood method.
Denote as kjtp  the estimate of the probability of transition to state j
(j = –1, 0, 1) in day t for k-th investor. Since the matrix of transition
probabilities is invariant in time, its value is determined by the state in
the previous moment of time. The probability that an investor will be in
an "active" state, that is "buy" or "sell," in period t is equal to
k
t
k
t pp 01−= .
In our notations, the following random variable has zero mean:
k
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k
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Let us sort the whole sample of 2K market participants in descending
order according to the number of days when an investor was in an active
state. All market participants can be equally divided into two groups of
more active and less active investors. If parameter α is close to unity,
then we expect that the probability of being in an active state ktp  will be
overestimated for the group of less active investors (E| kta |<
k
tp ) and
underestimated for the group of more active investors (E| kta |>
k
tp ). Let
us assume that the probability of transition from any state to "indiffer-
ence" state is greater then 1/2. Then for investors from the first sub-
group, random variable kts  will have a negative bias:
( )
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k =1, ..., K.
With small values of α, the picture changes into the converse one. In-
deed, under a stronger definition of active state, the frequency of sell
and buy states for active investors goes sharply down which results in
underestimation of the active state probability for the group of less active
investors. It should be again emphasized that signs of biases depend on
the assumption that the probability of transition in an active state is less
than 1/2. The presence of biases can be digested in large samples.
Hence, in order to test for biases we calculated the following statistics
for a given value of α:
∑
=
=
K
k
k
tt sK
s
1
1
. (12)
By definition, st is the average of 
k
ts  across the sample of more active
investors. If the null hypothesis about homogeneity of investors is cor-
rect, then for each period of time t we can assume st to be independent
and normally distributed random variables according to the Central limit
theorem. The null hypothesis can be tested using a simple t-test addi-
tionally assuming that st are realizations of single normally distributed
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random variables. A similar procedure is used in financial literature in or-
der to test the hypothesis of herding behavior in stock markets (see La-
konishok et al., 1992). Herding behavior is tested by calculating biases in
tendencies to sell and buy individual assets.
Before we apply the methodology of choice of optimal transformation
from continuous to discrete data, we need to make a preliminary analysis
to construct a sample of investors. Since we expect to include all key
market participants in the sample who were also the most speculatively
active, then we should exclude inactive participants to ensure homoge-
neity of the sample. Let us consider the group of non-residents that held
a non-zero GKO-OFZ portfolio throughout the crisis period. For different
values of α and for each non-resident, we calculated the share of trading
days when he was in one of the "active" states (active trading days).
The issue of heterogeneity of investors is related to the difference in de-
gree of their involvement in market speculation. From Fig. 6 it can be
seen that a change in value α makes a noticeable difference only for the
first 30 investors. This observation gave us the justification for singling
out active non-residents, which we assumed to be a group of homoge-
neous investors. There was still a technical problem; for different values
of α, the group of the first 30 investors was not identical. Fortunately, by
excluding investors from Cyprus9 and the republics of the former Soviet
                                               
9 Except those that are known to be 100% foreign companies.
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Fig. 6. Distribution of non-residents with respect to the share of active
trading days.
α = 0.1
α = 0.5
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Union, we were left with the group of 22 non-residents that were among
the first 30 for all three values of α. Most of these non-residents are
well-known international investment banks with headquarters in London.
The fact that during the period of crisis about 90% of non-residents'
GKO-OFZ portfolios were concentrated within this group of investors
suggests that the sample includes key non-resident investors.
Applying the same approach to resident investors (here dealers), we
have not found any observable break point between (speculatively) active
and non-active investors (see Fig. 7). Hence, we decided to consider all
the dealers that held non-empty GKO-OFZ portfolios throughout the pe-
riod of crisis as a homogenous group of investors.
Based on the sample of market participants, we tested for homogeneity
using different values of α which are uniformly distributed in [0, 1] (see
Table 4).
Table 4. Test for homogeneity.
α 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
t-statistic 8.66 6.10 3.72 1.31 –1.48 –3.66 –4.56 –0.33 6.34 20.43
0.8
1 19 37 55 73 91 109 127 145
α = 0.9
α = 0.5
α = 0.1
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1.0
Fig. 7. Distribution of residents (dealers) with respect to share of active
trading days.
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First we estimated transition probabilities by means of the maximum like-
lihood method and then calculated t-statistics for the test of bias of st
(see (12)). The minimal value of t-statistic is achieved for α = 0.8. How-
ever, this is attributed to the probability of transition in an active state,
which is close to 1/2 (see (11)). For α < 0.8 this probability is less than
1/2, and for large values of the parameter we observe negative bias as
expected. The values of t-statistics suggest that there is no significant
bias for α = 0.4 and 0.5. Hence, further we will base our conclusions on
the results obtained for these two values of the parameter α.
Now we turn to the specification of the appropriate model of testing for
herding behavior. We model the behavior of investors as a Markov proc-
ess with the matrix of conditional transition probabilities being a function
of the matrix of unconditional probabilities where the external variable
that stands for common factors (see (9)). The difference in behavior
between residents and non-residents can appear in different matrices
of unconditional probabilities, time path of common factors and pa-
rameter θ. As it follows, we have many dimensions of possible differ-
ences. The null hypothesis of no difference in behavior implies that non-
residents' behavior was not influenced by some private information which
is different from the common information available to residents. Let us
assume the following proxy for common factors that affected the actions
of residents:10
( )∑ ∑ 



−=ρ
=τ
τ−τ−
i
itit
t
t sbN
5
1
sign
1
. (13)
Here Nt is the number of residents that participated in secondary trading
in any of five previous trading days, bit–τ and sit–τ are values of securities
bought and sold correspondingly during trading day t – τ.
Let us place a restriction on the matrices of unconditional transition
probabilities for residents and non-residents by assuming them to be
equal. In this case the test of the null hypothesis of no difference takes
the form of testing equality θr = θn, where θr and θn are θ-coefficients in
function (9) for residents and non-residents correspondingly and ρt is
defined by (13).
Suppose, however, that non-residents were different with respect to
speculative activity, which does not mean that they had different prefer-
ences. In terms of the model, this implies that the matrix of transition
                                               
10 The number of days was chosen arbitrarily.
6. DID NOT RESIDENTS HERD? 37
probabilities for non-residents is different from that of residents. Hence,
θn estimated under the assumption of no difference in matrices can
naturally deviate from θr. Nevertheless, we can still expect that it should
not be negative. Hence if there was no difference in behavior between
residents and non-residents, we expect to find that residents' common
information affected the actions of non-residents in the same manner:
θn > 0. We will use the last inequality as a formal representation of the
null hypothesis. One of the reasons behind adopting the assumption of
equal transition probabilities was the small number of analyzed non-
residents (only 21 excluding the leader), which is insufficient to produce
reliable estimates of transition probabilities.11
Before we proceed with the statistical analysis, we need to determine the
period of estimation. Statistical models of the stationary type like our
model require a stationary time series. For example, in the case of sim-
ple linear regression, if the dependent variable has a significant outlier in
some period of time, then estimates of regression coefficients are sig-
nificant if and only if the independent variables explain this particular
event. In other words, the major weight in regression is assigned to this
particular moment of time; therefore, estimation results are non-
informative. The same kind of phenomenon can happen in our case tak-
ing also into account that we are dealing with a crisis period. In order to
restrict the period of observations by excluding sharp movements in the
series, we constructed an indicator that measured the gap in trading
tendencies between residents and non-residents. For the sample of non-
residents we calculated the indicator of their average direction of trade
the same way as it was done for residents (see (13)) and denoted
it as ntρ . We used series ntt ρ−ρ  as a dynamic measure of the gap (see
Fig. 8).
In the graph, we show the point of time that corresponds to the arrival of
news about the agreement reached between the Russian government
and the IMF on emergency credit to support the balance of payments.
One can observe sharp and sizeable movements of the indicator there-
after. Based on this observation we restricted the period of estimation by
excluding this time interval. Precisely, we chose the following period for
estimating the model parameters: November 1997 – mid-July 1998.12
The results of the test are given in Table 5. Estimation was carried out
using maximum likelihood methodology. The significance of coefficients
                                               
11 Welch (1999) does not estimate these probabilities and assumes them equal to
sample frequencies. We can not use this approach again because of the insuffi-
cient number of observations.
12 November 3, 1997 – July 14, 1998.
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was verified using asymptotic properties of the maximum likelihood esti-
mator: –2(LR – LUR) ∼ χ2(1).
Table 5. Test of the difference of behavior between residents and non-residents.
α 0.3
                                      
                                      
0.4
                                      
                                   
                                   
0.5
                                   
0.6
Nr 7434                                       8032                                    8700 9436
Nn 1232
                                      1294                                    1363 1439
θr 0.30***
(0.00%)
                                      
0.30***
                                      
                                      
(0.00%)
                                   
0.32***
                                   
                                   
(0.00%)
0.30***
(0.00%)
θn –0.21***
(0.87%)
                                      –0.18**
                                      
(2.19%)
                                   –0.14*
                                   
(7.92%)
–0.12
(13.01%)
Note: Nr — total number of individual observations that correspond to active states of resi-
dents. Nn — the same for non-residents (21 investors excluding the leader). Significance is
shown in parenthesis: */**/*** indicates significance at 90%/95%/99% correspondingly.
We excluded the leader from the sample of non-residents since his
actions will be considered as an exogenous factor. As it follows from Ta-
ble 5, the hypothesis of no difference in behavior between residents and
non-residents is rejected with good probability for α = 0.4. For all con-
sidered values of α, estimates of θr are significantly positive and almost
identical. Therefore, the use of a proxy for residents' common informa-
tion seems to be justified.
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Fig. 8. Gap between average behavior of residents and non-residents.
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The idea of testing for herding behavior is the following. We allow coeffi-
cient θn to be time dependent by introducing the behavior of the leader
as an external factor that might have affected the intensity and sign of
influence of common information available to residents on non-residents'
behavior. If there was no imitation, then we expect to find that this effect
is insignificant. Let us denote as lt the sign of the net value of state
bonds purchased by the leader in the secondary market during the pe-
riod of [t – 1, t – 5]. We expect that the more the action of the leader
deviated from residents' behavior, the less non-residents were sensitive
to residents' common factors. Formally the gap between residents' be-
havior and leader's actions was proxied by (lt – ρt)2:
2
0 )( ttnnt l ρ−φ+θ=θ . (14)
The case of φ = 0 corresponds to no influence of the leader on the ac-
tions of other non-residents. In the opposite case we expect it to be sig-
nificantly negative.
Note that results obtained from model estimation based on (14) can be
interpreted differently. One may argue that if the leader's behavior was
not different from that of an average non-resident, then (lt – ρt)2 also
measures the gap between the directions of trade of residents and non-
residents. In this case, the fact that this gap negatively influences coeffi-
cient θnt only suggests that there was no convergence between the
trading tendencies of residents and non-residents but does not provide
evidence of imitation. To control for this possibility we included (ρt – ntρ )2
in the linear equation (14):
22
0 )()( t
n
tttnnt l ρ−ρϕ+ρ−φ+θ=θ . (15)
The results of the estimation based on (15) are given in Table 6. As it
follows the hypothesis of herding behavior is supported. Indeed, coeffi-
cient φ proved to be negative with a good degree of significance for both
considered values of α. Estimates of ϕ are positive, however, of low sig-
nificance.
The applied specification allows for testing the importance of herding
behavior in explaining the lack of relationship between non-residents'
behavior and residents' common factors. Strictly speaking we can not
test the hypothesis that non-residents' behavior would not have been
different from that of residents' behavior if there had been no imitation.
Imitation is already inherent in the estimated parameters of the model,
and we can not exclude it by placing restrictions on the coefficients.
However, we can compare the imaginable behavior of non-residents and
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residents if the leader did not deviate in his behavior from the represen-
tative resident. Let us denote as ∗ti  the stochastic process such that
cov 0),( =∗ τ−
∗
tt II ,          
∗
tI  = –1 or 1, and E(
∗
tI ) = ρt. (16)
In this case coefficient θnt is also a stochastic process and is described
by the following equation:
2*
0 )( ttnnt l ρ−φ+θ=θ , (17)
with mean
)1)(1()( 0 ttnntE ρ+ρ−φ+θ=θ . (18)
Random variable θnt can take both positive and negative values even if
the actions of the leader were not different from that of the average
resident. Moreover, its mean can also take on negative values. Never-
theless, one can expect that "on average" θnt is positive. In other words,
Table 6. Test for the hypothesis of herding behavior.
0.3
                                    
                                    0.4
                                  
                                  0.5 0.6
Nr 7434
                                    
                                    
8032
                                  
                                  
8700 9436
Nn 1232                                     1294                                   1363 1439
Nl 58                                     69                                   80 92
θr 0.30***
(0.00%)
                                    
0.30***
                                    (0.00%)
                                  
0.32***
                                  (0.00%)
0.31***
(0.00%)
θno 0.15
(47.72%)
                                    
                                    
0.29
                                    
(16.68%)
                                  
                                  
0.40*
                                  
(5.58%)
0.49**
(1.97%)
φ –0.36**
(3.57%)
                                    –0.44**
                                    (0.95%)
                                  –0.50***
                                  (0.26%)
–0.62***
(0.06%)
ϕ 0.37
(30.75%)
                                    
                                    
0.39
                                    
(28.44%)
                                  
                                  
0.38
                                  
(28.80%)
0.49
(17.16%)
Note: Nr — total number of individual observations that correspond to active states of resi-
dents. Nn — the same for non-residents (21 investor excluding the leader). Nl — number of
observations of the leader's active states. Significance is shown in parentheses: */**/*** indi-
cates significance at 90%/95%/99% correspondingly.
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the following constant should be positive:
AE
T nt
ntn φ+θ=θ=θ ∑ 0* )(1 , (19)
where
∑ ρ+ρ−=
t
ttT
A )1)(1(
1
.
The statistical significance of ∗θn  can be tested and is equivalent to the
significance of the following restriction placed on the coefficients of
equation (14):
00 =φ+θ An . (20)
Hence, in order to test if herding behavior explains the lack of relation-
ship between residents' common factors and non-residents' behavior,
we estimate the coefficients of equation (14) and test restriction (20).
The results of the test are presented in Table 7.
As it follows, exclusion of the effect of the leader leads to insignificant
estimates of θn meaning that herding behavior at least explains the polar
difference in behavior between residents and non-residents. It should be
emphasized that results of this kind of analysis depend on the assumed
statistical model. Indeed, we can not guarantee that if another, for ex-
ample, more sophisticated model was applied that we would arrive at
similar conclusions. In other words, we tested if the herding by non-
Table 7. Evaluation of the significance of herding behavior.
α 0.3
                                  
                                  
0.4
                                  
                                 
                                 
0.5
                                 
0.6
Nr 7434                                   8032                                  8700 9436
Nn 1232
                                  1294                                  1363 1439
Nl     58
                                  
    69
                                 
    80     92
∗θn –0.15*(9.64%)
                                  
–0.10
                                  
                                  
(25.33%)
                                 
–0.04
                                 
                                 
(64.37%)
–0.00
(42.89%)
Note: Nr — total number of individual observations that correspond to active states of resi-
dents. Nn — the same for non-residents (21 investor excluding the leader). Nl — number of
observations of the leader's active states. Significance is shown in parentheses: */**/*** indi-
cate significance at 90%/95%/99% correspondingly.
FINANCIAL CRISIS IN RUSSIA: THE BEHAVIOR OF NON-RESIDENTS42
residents explains the "observed" difference in behavior between resi-
dents and non-residents.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this paper, we analyzed the behavior of non-residents during the pe-
riod of the Russian financial crisis of 1997–1998. The purpose of this re-
search was to explain the commonly accepted fact, which was also sup-
ported by data, that non-residents destabilized the state bond market
during the crisis period. It is obviously impossible within one study to
cover all related issues and provide a comprehensive analysis of all pos-
sible explanations of the stylized facts. Therefore we concentrated on
two hypotheses that seem to be realistic for the case of the Russian fi-
nancial market. The first hypothesis states that the destabilizing behavior
of non-residents can be explained by their relative overreaction to fun-
damentals. Non-residents being global investors have highly diversified
portfolios and hence have richer alternative opportunities for investment.
The theoretical model developed in this paper allowed us to draw the
following major conclusions:
1. in a country with high investment risk, non-residents contribute to a
greater fall in prices in the bond market after adverse external internal
shocks to fundamentals;
2. it is unlikely that non-residents and residents will differ with respect to
the share of buyers during transition from one equilibrium to another
after external shocks to fundamentals.
The first conclusion supports the initial argument that the destabilizing
behavior of non-residents can be attributed to the natural differences in
alternative investment opportunities. The second conclusion provides us
with a clear implication that provides a means for testing the hypothesis.
As it follows from the statistical analysis, non-residents and residents
were significantly different with respect to their buyer ratio. This result
suggests that the hypothesis does not explain all stylized facts.
The second hypothesis that was considered in the paper was whether
non-residents exhibit herding behavior as a result of imitating leaders'
actions. The rationale behind this hypothesis was the observation of a
large foreign investor (the leader) that was noticeably different from oth-
ers both with respect to the size of GKO-OFZ portfolio and volume
of secondary market operations and a relatively narrow group of key
non-residents. The results of the statistical testing of this hypothesis
suggest that:
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1. the leader's actions had significant impact on the behavior of other
key foreign participants;
2. herding behavior at least explains the polar difference in behavior
between residents and non-residents.
There are several policy implications that can be derived from our find-
ings. First, non-residents should not be freely allowed to enter financial
markets of unstable economies. It is likely that the presence of non-
residents will lead to an overreaction of the market to changes in funda-
mentals. This overreaction is a benefit in good times but can be fatal in
bad ones. Second, authorities should pay attention to the microstructure
of market participants. In particular, there should not be "leaders" in the
market that can influence the decisions of other market participants. This
can be achieved by placing quantitative restrictions on investments made
by individual companies. Foreign companies may overcome such barriers
by investing via numerous branches; however, this measure is not abso-
lutely ineffective. Indeed, first, it is costly for investors to establish many
branches to perform one task. Another argument is that the diffusion of
the portfolio of a large investor between different companies will make
it less likely that the market will have reliable information about his
strategy.
A high degree of concentration of foreign investment is the natural out-
come of two factors that are relevant for an emerging market economy:
1) high information costs that require scaled investment to make market
research profitable; 2) relatively low financial capitalization that forces a
scaled investor to hold a significant portion of the market. As it follows, a
large investor is also an informed investor, which is good rather than
bad. This argument obviously makes sense; however, our findings sug-
gest that the problem of possible adverse outcomes of a leader-type
market should not be ignored.
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APPENDICES
1. Proof of Proposition 1
Let us denote as Dr(n)(p, q) the function of residents' (non-residents')
demand for bonds. The equilibrium condition under the assumption of
fixed supply can be formally written as
SqpDqpD nr =+ ),(),( . (21)
A necessary and sufficient condition for non-residents to sell bonds and
residents to buy bonds in equilibrium in the case of a small decrease in
q (dq < 0) is a positive sign of the full derivative of non-residents' de-
mand function with respect to q. According to the definition,
p
A
D iII
ω
=  (i = r, n).
A negative change in q has its effect on demand via three channels. A
fall in expected payoff results in reduction of the optimal share of assets
to be invested in bonds for any given level of prices. Decease in prices
have two opposite effects. Firstly, lower prices have positive effect on
the demand due to substitution effect, secondly, lower prices result in
loss of value of previously held portfolio, which translates into lower de-
mand. Prior to the shock, investors held
p
Aω
bonds. Hence, the change in the value of assets due to a change in
price is equal to
dp
p
Aω
.
A change in demand due to devaluation of assets is equal to
dp
p
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=δω=δ .
The full differential of demand is the following:
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By differentiating (21) using expression (22), we arrive at the following
expression for the price differential:
dq
p
D
q
D
dp rn 


∂
∂
+
∂
∂
∆
=
1
,
where


 ω
+
ω
+
∂
∂
+
∂
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−=∆
p
D
p
D
p
D
p
D rrnnrn .
By assumption of the proposition, a worsening in fundamentals leads to
a decrease in prices or
0>
dq
dp
.
As it will be shown below, partial derivatives of investors' demand with
respect to q are positive; hence, we are able to conclude that ∆ > 0. Af-
ter differentiation of equality (21) and substitution of the expression for
the price differential, it is straightforward to obtain the necessary and
sufficient conditions for non-residents to sell and residents to buy after
an adverse external shock:
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Since by assumption the denominator in the right hand side of the
equality is positive, then the necessary and sufficient condition can be
written as
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Due to
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∂
∂
q
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(20) is equivalent to:
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The necessary and sufficient condition for non-residents to sell bonds
and residents to buy bonds in the case of an increase in δ2 is the
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negative sign of the full derivative of non-residents' demand with respect
to δ2 (dδ2 > 0):
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Dividing both sides of inequality (22) by the positive number
22 δ∂
∂
δ∂
∂ nr DD ,
we obtain the following equivalent condition:
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From the first order condition of the maximization of expected utility (2),
it is easy to get the following internal solutions for optimal shares of as-
sets invested in bonds:
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Here ωn and ωr are shares of assets of non-residents and residents in-
vested in bonds. After substitution of r = q/p – 1 and σ2 = δ2/p2, (27) is
transformed into
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Differentiating (28) with respect to p, q and δ2 we obtain
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Let us prove the first statement of the proposition.
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Using assumption )])(,max(41[ 22 nrnnr σ+σγγ+ω>ω , we conclude that
inequality (26) does not hold.
Let us prove the second statement of the proposition.
Using (29) and (30) we can rewrite the left-hand side of inequality (21) in
the following way:
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If we skip the first term in the sum due to its small value, following the
assumption of the proposition, then inequality (21) holds if and only if the
expression in the parentheses is positive. Hence, if the variance of resi-
dents' alternative investment is not large enough, then non-residents buy
bonds in equilibrium. In the opposite case non-residents sell bonds to
resident investors.
2. Proof of Proposition 2
In period 1, there exist four types of investors that differ with respect to
type and information received. For convenience, we can assume that the
separation of optimists and pessimists occurred in period 0. Hence, we
can consider q as a parameter and the demand for bonds by each type
of investors as a function of this parameter. Further in the proof, we will
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abstract from the wealth effect since it works against the difference be-
tween residents and residents and assume Ai (i = n, r) to be constant. In
other words, condition (7) is also sufficient if we take into account the
wealth effect.
Similar to what has been done in the proof of Proposition 1, it easy to
establish that the necessary and sufficient condition for pessimistic non-
residents to sell is
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If we note that
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then it is straightforward to obtain the following expressions for the par-
tial derivative (similar to (29) and (30)):
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Let us prove that pessimistic non-residents reduce their portfolio in equi-
librium given the specified external shock to fundamentals. It suffices to
show that each term in the sum in the left-hand side of (33) is positive:
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This inequality follows from the assumption that the partial derivative of
demand for bonds is negative with respect to the price.
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Similarly we arrive at the necessary and sufficient condition that optimis-
tic residents buy bonds in equilibrium.
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Let us show that each term in the sum is negative. It was already proven
that the first one is negative.
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The necessary and sufficient condition for optimistic non-residents to
buy is
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The first term is less than zero as was proven above. Let us show that
under the conditions stated in Proposition 2, the sum of the last two
terms on the left hand side of the inequality is also less than zero.
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After reduction by a common multiplier, we get the following equivalent
condition:
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we arrive at the following inequality:
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Making use of assumption rrnn ωγ<<ωγ , r ≥ 0 and the fact that due to
an infinite number of investors, −χr  can take only two possible values:
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π or 1 – π or at least not less than 1 – π. We get the following sufficient
condition:
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Now if we use assumption ωr ≤ 0.5, which implies that
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we arrive at a weaker sufficient condition than (7):
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Let us show that pessimistic residents sell bonds if condition (7) of the
proposition holds. It suffices to show that
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Since the second term was shown to be positive, we show that the sum
of the other two is also positive.
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Similar to the previous case, reduction by the common multiplier and re-
arranging terms gives the following equivalent condition:
−+− +
−π
<ωγπ−+πσ−σ+πωγσ−σ rrrnnrnnnn ArAAA )1(2
12
])1([)()( 2222 .
Using similar substitution, we arrive at
+χ+−π<πγωσ−σ+ωπγσ−σ nrrrnnn r)1(2
12
)()( 2222 .
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Taking into account that rrnn ωγ<<ωγ , π−>χ+ 1n , we obtain the follow-
ing sufficient condition:
( )
π
π−−π
<ωσ−σγ
2
)1(12
)( 22 rrr . (35)
Assumption ωr ≤ 0.5 and its implication (see above) allows us to conclude
that (35) follows from inequality (7).
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